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CRIMINAL LAW-DISTINGUISHING LACK OF MENs REA FROM INSANITY
United States v. Pohlot (1987)
In 1984 Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act' (the
Act or section 17) which sets forth the "only affirmative defense based
on mental disorder[s] ... applicable in [the] Federal courts."' 2 This Act
essentially codified the M'Naghten test for insanity,3 abolished the di-
minished capacity defense 4 and rejected the Model Penal Code test for
insanity5 which had been adopted by a majority of the circuits. 6
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 20 (Supp. III 1985)). The
Act provides:
(a) Affirmative defense.-It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under
any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting
the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.
Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of proof.-The defendant has the burden of proving the de-
fense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986).
2. H.R. REP. No. 98-577, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983) [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 577].
3. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 4.3(e), at 330-31 (2d ed.
1986). The M'Naghten test for insanity (also referred to as the right-wrong test)
requires that the accused suffer from such a defect of reason that at the time he
committed the criminal act he did not know either the nature and quality of his
act or that it was wrong. Id. § 4.2, at 310.
4. Comment, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity Defense, 46
LA. L. REV. 337, 351 (1985); see generally Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and
Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 827 (1977); Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984). For a discussion of the diminished capacity de-
fenses, see infra notes 47-59 and 94-100 and accompanying text.
5. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 896 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 710 (1988). Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code provides:
Section 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Code and Commentaries 1985) (emphasis added).
The italicized portion of the above formulation, commonly known as the "voli-
tional prong" of the Model Penal Code test, was deleted by Congress through
the enactment of § 17. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 896.
6. Prior to the passage of the Act in 1984, the following circuits had
adopted some formulation of The Model Penal Code test: United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc); Wade v. United States, 426
F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States, 426 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Chandler,
393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.
(654)
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Although the Act narrowed the scope of the insanity defense, it has cre-
ated confusion among the circuits over whether evidence of mental ab-
normality is admissible to prove that a defendant lacked the criminal
intent (mens rea)7 required for the commission of the offense charged.8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed
this issue for the first time in United States v. Pohlot.9 In Pohlot, the gov-
ernment contended that section 17(a) barred a defendant from intro-
ducing evidence of mental abnormality on the issue of mens rea. 10 The
court held that the defendant's admission of psychiatric evidence for the
purpose of negating mens rea did not constitute an affirmative defense;
rather, it was an attack on the state's prima facie case, thus rendering
section 17(a) inapplicable. 1 '
In July 1985, Stephen Pohlot, a successful pharmacist and private
1967); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United
States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
7. " 'Criminal intent' ... is often taken to be synonymous with mens rea, the
general notion that except for strict liability offenses some form of mental state
is a prerequisite to guilt." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT; supra note 3, § 3.5(e), at 223.
For a general discussion of the concepts of mens rea and intent and their place
in criminal law, see id., § 3.4, at 212-16.
8. Compare United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 964 (1st Cir.) (use of
psychiatric testimony to show defendant's lack of awareness as to existence of
schemes to defraud misleading and of questionable utility), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
901 (1985) and Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573, 1582 (11 th Cir. 1984)
(upheld state court's exclusion of psychiatric testimony on specific intent be-
cause such evidence would confuse jury on insanity issue), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1126 (1986) and Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124, 1143 (7th Cir. 1983) ("When
a court rejects the doctrine of diminished capacity, it is saying that psychiatric
evidence is inadmissible on the mens rea issue .... "), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228
(1984) with United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1977) (expert
evidence bearing on defendant's psychological makeup is relevant to jury's con-
sideration of whether defendant harbored necessary criminal intent) and United
States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.) (psychiatric testimony not admissi-
ble because not offered to negate mental state but as justification), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 925 (1976) and United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 986 n.14 (9th
Cir. 1975) (use of expert testimony to negate mens rea different from use to
relieve defendant of liability based on insanity or diminished capacity) and
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998-1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc)
(expert testimony of defendant's mental condition may be admitted to show that
defendant did not have specific mental state required for particular crime or
degree of crime) and Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59, 60-61 (4th Cir.)
(psychiatric testimony bearing on absence of mental state has rightful place in
the record), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912 (1960).
9. 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988). The
panel consisted of Circuit Judges Becker and Higgenbotham, with Judge
Dumbauld of the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania sitting by designation. Id. at 890. Judge Becker wrote for a unanimous
panel. Id.
10. Id. at 896. For a further discussion of the government's position, see
infra note 31 and accompanying text.
11. Id. at 903. For a further discussion of the court's interpretation of sec-
tion 17(a), see infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
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investor, entered into a scheme with George Neustadt and Michael
Selkow to murder his wife Elizabeth.' 2 Earlier that summer, Elizabeth
Pohlot had obtained a court order removing Pohlot from their home
and had filed for divorce. 13 The government theorized that Pohlot's
primary motive for having his wife killed was to keep silent her knowl-
edge of the location of assets which Pohlot had hidden from the Internal
Revenue Service. 14
"Pohlot was indicted on five counts of using interstate commerce
facilities, i.e., the telephone, in the commission of murder for hire,"' 5
"and one count of conspiring to commit that offense."1 6 At trial Pohlot
offered two interrelated defenses: first, that he had withdrawn from the
12. Id. at 891. Neustadt, Pohlot's friend and business associate, testified
that Pohlot told him that he (Pohlot) was thinking of killing Elizabeth and
wanted to know if Neustadt could arrange the murder. Id. Neustadt then con-
tacted Selkow. Id. Selkow, who unknown to Neustadt had become a government
informant, agreed to bring in an assassin from Italy. Id. Pohlot met with Selkow
to discuss the terms of the murder. Id. In the course of their tape-recorded
conversation, Pohlot agreed to pay Selkow $25,000 and gave Selkow $8,000 as a
downpayment on the murder contract. Id. Pohlot stressed that the murder "had
to 'appear to be an accident.' " Id. at 891-92.
Approximately two weeks later, Selkow and Pohlot met at a rest stop on the
NewJersey Turnpike. Id. at 892. That night Pohlot called Selkow and cancelled
the murder. Id. The next day the FBI arrested Neustadt and Pohlot. Id. Selkow
was later arrested and charged with obstruction ofjustice. Id.
The government contended that Selkow, for personal reasons, wished to
slow down the Pohlot case, and that he told Pohlot that he thought his telephone
might be bugged and to place the cancellation call to throw the authorities off
the track. Id. Pohlot denied that Selkow staged the call but claimed that he
finally " 'came to his senses' " and decided to take action to prevent the crime
before it occurred. Id.
13. Id. at 891. As a result of the divorce proceedings, Pohlot's assets were
frozen. Id. Elizabeth also charged Pohlot with abuse. Id. at 891-92. Pohlot told
Selkow that Elizabeth had fabricated the charges in order to secure an order
barring Pohlot from the family home. Id. at 891.
14. Id. at 892. In the course of the tape-recorded conversations between
Pohlot and Selkow, Pohlot repeatedly mentioned that Elizabeth was "aware of
money that he had stashed away." Id. at 891.
15. Id. at 892. Specifically, Pohlot was convicted as both a principal and as
an aider and abettor. United States v. Pohlot, Crim. No. 85-00354-01, slip op. at
2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 1986) (WESTLAW, OCT database, Mar. 31, 1986).
Pohlot was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1952A which provides that it is a
crime "[to] travel in interstate ... commerce, or use [] ... the mail or any other
facility in interstate ... commerce, with intent that a murder be committed in
violation of the laws of any State or the United States as consideration for the
receipt of... anything of pecuniary value." 18 U.S.C. § 1952A (Supp. IV 1986).
He was also convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) which provides that
"[w]hoever... aids [and] abets [an offense] . .. is punishable as a principal." 18
U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982).
16. 827 F.2d at 892; see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982); id. § 1952A. Section 371
provides in pertinent part: "If two or more persons conspire ... to commit any
offense against the United States... and one or more of such persons do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 371.
656 [Vol. 33: p. 654
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plot 17 and second, that he was insane at the time the crime was commit-
ted.18 Pohlot maintained that the "entire experience had been a fantasy,
representing an unrealistic attempt to overcome an inability to deal with
his wife's abuse" and that once he " 'came to his senses' " and realized
"that a crime was going to be committed" he withdrew from the conspir-
acy. 19 In support of his position, Pohlot offered expert psychiatric testi-
mony concerning his mental state, 20 evidence of his wife's abusive
treatment and his inability to respond to it2 ' and evidence of his belief
that the murder plot was a fantasy. 2 2
The jury convicted Pohlot of all the offenses for which he was
charged.2 3 Pohlot appealed to the Third Circuit, charging that the dis-
trict court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider evi-
dence of Pohlot's mental condition when deciding whether Pohlot
possessed the mens rea required for these offenses. 24
After first rejecting the government's contention that the trial court
had not actually excluded evidence of mental abnormality on the issue
17. 827 F.2d at 892. The district court had instructed the jury that with-
drawal from the conspiracy was not a defense to acts committed prior to the
withdrawal, so that Pohlot "would still be guilty if he had conspired and made
telephone calls for the purpose of committing murder for hire." Id. The district
court's instruction on this matter was not at issue on appeal, because Pohlot had
"concentrated" his defense on the affirmative defense of insanity. Id. at 892,
894.
18. Id. Pohlot's primary defense at trial was the affirmative defense of in-
sanity. Id. at 892. However, Pohlot also wanted the district court to give an
instruction allowing the jury to consider evidence of mental abnormality in de-
ciding whether he possessed the requisite mens rea. Id. at 894. The district
court denied the request on the ground that Pohlot's requested instruction was
based upon the prohibited diminished capacity defense. Id. For a further dis-
cussion of the diminished capacity defense, see infra notes 47-59 & 94-100 and
accompanying text.
19. Id. at 892.
20. Id. at 893-94. Dr. Gary Glass met with Pohlot a number of times, and
"relying only on Pohlot's version of events," offered an explanation of the de-
fendant's actions. Id. Dr. Glass' diagnosis characterized "Pohlot as a 'compul-
sive personality, passive dependent personality and passive aggressive
personality' " who "had characteristically shown an inability to assert himself
and to gain control of his life." Id. at 893.
21. Id. at 892. Pohlot testified that Elizabeth "had broken his thumb by
crashing a coffee pot down on it; deeply gouged his face with her nails;
threatened him with a hunting knife; shot him in the stomach; and often locked
him out of their house and bedroom." Id. at 891. He also felt that it was his
wife's fault that two of their children were anorexic. Id. Pohlot claimed that his
failure to prosecute his wife after she shot him was evidence of his inability to
respond. Id. at 892-93.
22. Id. at 893. Dr. Glass testified to Pohlot's disturbed mental state and
concluded that " 'the climactic event for [Pohlot was] the transaction, not [the]
murder,' " and that Pohlot believed that after he had hired someone to kill his
wife, "'they would go home and live together and be happier.'" Id.
23. Id. at 894. For a discussion of the charges, see supra notes 15 and 16
and accompanying text.
24. Id. at 894.
1988] 657
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of mens rea,2 5 the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether this
exclusion was proper. 26 In determining that it was proper, the court
examined the following three issues: the scope of section 17(a), 2 7 the
possible constitutional problems that could arise if section 17 did pre-
clude the admission of evidence bearing on the mens rea issue, 28 and
mens rea as distinguished from the diminished responsibility/
diminished capacity defenses.
29
In examining the scope of section 17, the court looked at both the
statutory language and the legislative history. The government main-
tained that, in light of statutory language3 0 which states that, apart from
25. Id. at 894-95. The government argued that although the trial court re-
jected Pohlot's requested mens rea instruction, the trial court suggested that the
jury could consider evidence of mental abnormality when it instructed that ju-
rors that if they
'believe[d] that somehow it was a mistake by the Defendant, that he did
not understand, appreciate what was going on, [then] he didn't have
the mens rea. If, on the other hand, you think he did understand what
was going on as defined, when I say understand what was going on, I mean
within the framework of his legal sanity or insanity, then the mens rea has been
met.'
Id. at 895 (emphasis added by the court of appeals). However, the Third Circuit
found that "[t]his instruction conflated the issues of mens rea and the issues of
the insanity defense and suggested that the evidence of mental abnormality
could prove only insanity." Id. The court admitted that "the issue [was] a close
one" but concluded that on the whole the instructions excluded this evidence on
the mens rea issue. Id.
26. Id. at 895. Although the Third Circuit agreed with the district court
that the evidence should have been excluded, the Third Circuit implied that the
district court excluded the evidence for the wrong reason. Id. at 907. Pohlot
had moved for a judgment of acquittal or new trial on the grounds that, inter
alia, the court had erred in instructing the jury on the mens rea issue. Id. at 894.
The district court rejected the "motion on the grounds that Pohlot was 'assert-
ing a diminished capacity defense' that Congress had abolished . I. " d. (quot-
ing United States v. Pohlot, Crim. No. 85-00354-01, slip op. at 9-13 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 27, 1986) (WESTLAW, OCT database, Mar. 31, 1986). The district court
asserted that Congress had "taken the view that mental conditions relating to an
abnormality or defect is an 'all or nothing' defense, that is to say, either the
defendant must be able to establish insanity pursuant to the statute otherwise
psychiatric abnormalities or defects are not relevant." United States v. Pohlot,
Crim. No. 85-00354-01, slip op. at 10-11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 1986) (WESTLAW,
OCT. database, Mar. 31, 1986). In contrast, the Third Circuit concluded that
the Act did not bar all evidence of mental abnormality on the mens rea issue but
that "it did require the exclusion of evidence that does not support a legally
acceptable theory of a lack of mens rea." 827 F.2d at 906. Since Pohlot's evi-
dence amounted "to a variation of the partially diminished capacity defense,"
the court of appeals concluded that it was properly excluded. Id. at 907.
27. For a discussion of the scope of section 17(a), see infra notes 31-42 and
accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the possible constitutional problem, see infra notes
43-46 and accompanying text.
29. For a further discussion of the court's differentiation of mens rea from
diminished capacity, see infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
30. For the text of section 17(a), see supra note 1.
658
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an affirmative insanity defense, "mental disease or defect does not
otherwise constitute a defense," the Act clearly prohibited the admission
of evidence pertaining to mental abnormality unless it was offered in
connection with the insanity defense. 3 1 The court disagreed with this
construction and concluded that the statute barred only affirmative de-
fenses which excuse misconduct. 32 Furthermore, the legislative history
showed that Congress had used the term "defenses" in its precise, legal
meaning. 33
In its analysis of the Act, the court relied extensively on the House
and Senate reports accompanying the Act.3 4 Both reports indicated that
Congress "wished to abolish only [the] diminished responsibility and ca-
pacity defenses [and] not to abolish the use of psychiatric evidence to
disprove mens rea."'3 5 The court also examined Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 704(b) 36 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(b)3 7 and
31. 827 F.2d at 896. The government found support for its position in an
opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
'[Tihe courts have used the labels diminished responsibility, dimin-
ished capacity, and other nomenclature merely as a shorthand for the
proposition that expert evidence of mental abnormalities is admissible
on the question of whether the defendant in fact possessed a particular
mental state which is an element of the charged offense .... When a
court rejects the doctrine of diminished capacity, it is saying that psy-
chiatric evidence is inadmissible on the mens rea issue.'
Id. (quoting Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124, 1143 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1228 (1984)).
32. Id. at 897. The court concluded:
Because admitting psychiatric evidence to negate mens [rea] does
not constitute a defense but only negates an element of the offense,
§ 17(a) by its terms does not bar it. Section 17(a) states only that
'mental disease ... does not otherwise constitute a defense;' it does not
purport to establish a rule of evidence.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (Supp. IV 1986)).
33. Id. at 897-99. The court supported its position by referring to the
"Senate Report's discussion of the difference between affirmative defenses and
the negation of mens rea in the context of intoxication." Id. at 899 n.7.
34. Id. at 898-99. See H.R. REP. No. 577, supra note 2; S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3407 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 2251. Although the Senate version was en-
acted into law, the House version was substantially the same. 827 F.2d at 898.
35. 827 F.2d at 898-99. The court quoted language from the House Report
which stated that " '[miental disorders will remain relevant ... to the issue of the existence
of a mental state required for the offense, such as the specific intent required for certain
crimes.' " Id. at 898 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-557, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14
(1983) (footnote omitted by court) (emphasis supplied by court)). The court
also quoted the Senate Report which "state[d] that § 17(a) was intended to in-
sure only that evidence of mental disease will not resurrect the insanity defense
'in the guise of showing some other affirmative defense.' " Id. (quoting S. REP. No.
225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 299 (1984), reprinted in, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 3182, 3411 (emphasis supplied by court).
36. Rule 704(b) provides in pertinent part: "No expert witness testifying
with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case
may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the
1988] 659
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concluded that the government's position was inconsistent with both of
these rules.3 8
The court then noted that the "entire structure of the Congres-
sional debate suggest[ed] that Congress did not intend to bar evidence
of mental abnormality to prove a lack of mens rea. ' '39 During these de-
bates, the Justice Department and several members of Congress had
moved to abolish the insanity defense entirely.40 However, "[e]ven
those favoring abolition ... wished to preserve the defendant's right to
use psychiatric evidence to prove lack of mens rea." 4 1 Thus, the court
concluded that "it would be ironic" to interpret section 17 as a rejection
of the defendant's right to use psychiatric evidence to negate mens rea
since both supporters and opponents of section 17 wished to preserve
that right.
4 2
The court discussed the potential constitutional question which
could arise if it adopted the government's view that section 17 limited
the admission of evidence of mental abnormality to the affirmative de-
fense of insanity.43 The court expressed concern that precluding a de-
mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged .... FED. R. EvID.
704(b) (emphasis added).
37. Rule 12.2(b) provides in pertinent part: "If a defendant intends to in-
troduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other
mental condition . . .bearing upon the issue of guilt, the defendant shall ...
notify the attorney for the government ...." FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(b).
38. 827 F.2d at 899 & n.8. Both rules recognize that "expert testimony
negating the existence of specific intent may be offered in cases not involving [or
relying solely upon] the insanity defense." United States v. Frisbee, 623 F.
Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
39. 827 F.2d at 899. Congress' interest in reforming the insanity defense
began shortly after John Hinkley, Jr. was acquitted of attempting to kill Presi-
dent Reagan. Id. The debate centered on whether the insanity defense should
be reformed or abolished. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. & n.9. The court quoted Congressman Bill McCollum:
[S]ome years ago we gave the accused a second bite at the apple; that is
the opportunity to present a so-called insanity defense as an affirmative
defense, regardless of and in addition to the mental state of mind ques-
tion that the prosecutor has to prove. My proposal . . .would be to
abolish the second bite at the apple, do away with the separate insanity
defense and allow some expert testimony on the question of the ac-
cused having a mental disease or defect as it bears on the state of mind
issue ....
Id. at 899-900 (quoting 130 CONG. REc. H9674 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984)).
The court also noted that several bills were introduced by the abolitionists
which limited the defendant's use of psychiatric evidence to only the mens rea
issue. For a list of those bills, see id. at 899 n.9.
42. Id. at 899-900. The court noted that the proponents of the insanity
defense did not object to the abolitionist's approach to mens rea; rather, they
believed "the dangers of an insanity defense were overstated and ... abolition
'would alter that fundamental basis of Anglo-American criminal law: the exist-
ence of moral culpability as a prerequisite for punishment.' " Id. at 900 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 98-577, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1983)).
43. Id. at 900. The government argued that allowing the defendant to ad-
7
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fendant from presenting evidence on the mens rea issue would
effectively relieve the state of its burden, required by due process, to
prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.4 4
The court noted that merely because psychiatric evidence may be
introduced "in support of the affirmative defense of insanity does not
justify barring the evidence from negating the government's case-in-
chief."'4 5 Consequently, in light of the Act's legislative history which
mit evidence of mental abnormality in order to negate mens rea effectively
shifted the burden of proving sanity onto the government. Id. Congress put the
burden of proving insanity onto the defendant because "proving a defendant
sane beyond a reasonable doubt was virtually impossible." Id. The court re-
jected the government's argument and pointed out that insanity and mens rea
are two different legal concepts. Id.
44. Id. at 900-01 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)). The
Pohlot court explained that a defendant had a right to present a defense to any or
all of the elements of the charge, and that this included the right to introduce
"competent, reliable, and exculpatory evidence." Id. at 900-01. The court
noted that the Supreme Court consistently "has struck down 'arbitrary rules [of
evidence] that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying.' "
Id. at 901 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (invalidated rule
prohibiting accomplices from testifying in favor of defendant but permitting
them to testify for state)). The court also cited in this regard: Rock v. Arkansas,
107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987) (invalidated state rule preventing defendant from testify-
ing on subjects of hypnosis); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (court may
not exclude evidence of circumstances surrounding defendant's confession);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (court erroneously excluded ad-
verse witness' out of court confession). The court concluded that "[i]n light of
these cases, a rule barring evidence on the issue of mens rea may be unconstitu-
tional so long as we determine criminal liability in part through subjective states
of mind." 827 F.2d at 901. The court disagreed with a District of Columbia
Court of Appeals opinion which "suggested that evidence of mental abnormality
may and should be excluded from the issue of mens rea, because ... mens rea
exists as a legal fiction by which we infer a 'guilty mind' from objective facts."
Id. at 901 n. II (citing Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 83-92 (D.C. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977)).
45. 827 F.2d at 901. In additionto the clear logic of this position, the court
drew support from two analogous Supreme Court decisions. Id. The court of
appeals first examined Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), where the Court
held that a state may shift the burden of proving insanity to the defendant. 827
F.2d at 901. However, the Third Circuit noted that the Court "did not sanction,
and probably would not sanction, a jury charge that prevented a jury from con-
sidering evidence of mental abnormality in determining whether the state had
proven premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. This is
so because it was possible for the jury to have found the defendant " 'mentally
incapable of premeditation and deliberation ... and yet not have found him to
have been legally insane.' " Id. (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 794
(1952)).
The court of appeals also referred to Martin v. Ohio, 107 S. Ct. 1098
(1987), where the Supreme Court held that a state may place the burden of
proving self-defense on a defendant. 827 F.2d at 901. The Third Circuit noted
that the Marlin Court "indicated . . .that a state's right to shift the burden on
self-defense does not include the right to prevent a defendant from showing
self-defense in an effort to prove that she did not act with the mens rea of 'prior
calculation and design.' " Id. at 901 (quoting Martin v. Ohio, 107 S. Ct. 1098,
1102 (1987)).
8
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suggested that Congress wished to avoid the constitutional dilemma
presented by the government's position, the court refused to' adopt a
rule of evidence which would raise such a substantial constitutional
question.46
Although the court rejected the government's broad argument that
section 17(a) barred a defendant from introducing evidence of mental
abnormality on the issue of mens rea, it noted that the "Senate Report
makes clear that section 17(a) does preclude defenses akin to partially
diminished capacity or diminished responsibility."' 4 7 Thus, throughout
the Pohlot opinion, the court carefully differentiated mens rea from di-
minished responsibility. The court emphasized that there was an essen-
tial difference between negating an element of an offense, such as mens
rea, and raising an affirmative defense. 4 8 The court distinguished argu-
ments which deny that a defendant committed the offense charged be-
cause the government failed to satisfy all of the elements of that offense
from arguments which assert that a'defendant committed the offense
charged but that the defendant's misconduct should be excused for
some reason.49 The court held that evidence of mental abnormality
which addresses the former is admissible50 whereas evidence relating to
the latter may only be admitted if it satisfies the terms of section 17.51
46. 827 F.2d at 902-03. The court noted that Congress and the Justice De-
partment "embraced" the constitutional arguments. Id. at 902. The court
quoted the House Judiciary Committee:
By distinguishing the affirmative defense of insanity from the narrow
mens rea/mental state requirements, the Committee's approach meets
the constitutional requirement that the prosecutor prove all elements
beyond a reasonable doubt while placing on the defendant the burden
of demonstrating a reason for exculpation that presumes the existence
of these elements.
Id. at 903 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-577, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983)).
47. Id. at 903 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 229, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3411). "The Senate Report indi-
cates disapproval in this context not just of the creation of actual technical de-
fenses but also of presenting the jury with 'needlessly confusing psychiatric
testimony.' " Id. For a further discussion of the diminished capacity defenses
Congress disapproved of, see infra notes 55-61 & 95 and accompanying text.
48. Id. at 897. The principle that evidence of mental abnormality is admis-
sible to prove lack of mens rea "does not provide any grounds for acquittal not
provided in the definition of the offense. Properly understood, it is . . . not a
defense.., but merely a rule of evidence. Id. For example, " 'the voluntary use
of alcohol' does not constitute any 'species of a legally valid affirmative defense,'
but 'intoxication may negate a state of mind required for the commission of the
offense charged.' " Id. at 897 n.3 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
229 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3411).
49. Id. at 897. The court pointed to United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073
(7th Cir. 1977), as an example of a defendant's use of psychiatric evidence solely
to negate mens rea. 827 F.2d at 897. In Staggs, psychiatric evidence was admit-
ted to show that the defendant's mental state made it unlikely that he would
threaten a police officer. Id.
50. 827 F.2d at 897, 903.
51. Id. at 897; see also United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127 (D. D.C.
662 [Vol. 33: p. 654
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It is on this basis that the court distinguished jurisdictions which
held that rejection of the diminished capacity/responsibility doctrine
precludes admission of psychiatric evidence on the issue of mens rea.
52
The court stated that those courts failed to distinguish, as Congress had,
between evidence used to negate mens rea and the broader diminished
capacity defenses.
53
After acknowledging the widespread imprecision in courts' termi-
1987). In Gold, the district court permitted the defendant to use evidence of
mental abnormality on the issue of lack of mens rea but warned that counsel's
assertion that defendant did not know the quality of his acts at relevant time
periods approached an insanity defense, in which case the requirements of sec-
tion 17 were applicable. Id. at 1129.
52. 827 F.2d at 901 n.12; see, e.g., Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573,
1580-82 (11 th Cir. 1984) (upheld Florida rule excluding psychiatric testimony
on any issue other than insanity to prevent possible jury confusion), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1126 (1986); Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1983) (upheld
Wisconsin's policy of admitting psychiatric testimony only at insanity stage of
bifurcated trial), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984); Wahrlich v. Arizona, 479 F.2d
1137 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (upheld trial court's exclusion of psychiatric testi-
mony bearing on mens rea), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973); see also United
States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961 (1st Cir.) (admission of psychiatric testimony
would be misleading and of questionable utility), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901
(1985); State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484,486, 610 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1980) (psychi-
atric evidence pertaining to defendant's ability to form specific intent constitutes
diminished capacity defense which is inconsistent with M'Naghten); State v. Wil-
cox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 436 N.E.2d 523 (1982) (diminished capacity defense
not recognized, thus expert testimony that defendant lacked mental capacity to
form requisite mens rea inadmissible). The court of appeals cited two Supreme
Court decisions which also upheld the exclusion of mental abnormality on the
mens rea issue. 827 F.2d at 901 n.12 (citing Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S.
463 (1946) (affirmed exclusion of evidence of defendant's mental condition on
issues of deliberation and premeditation); Coleman v. California, 317 U.S. 596
(1942) (per curiam) (dismissing pro se appeal challenging California court's ex-
clusion of evidence of mental condition on mens rea issue)).
Footnote twelve of the Pohlot court's opinion lists cases which have rejected
various constitutional challenges to the exclusion of psychiatric evidence on the
issue of mens rea. Id. In each case, however, the applicable substantive criminal
law failed to distinguish between a mens rea theory of the type discussed in
Pohlot and a diminished capacity theory. Id. at 902 n.12. Consequently, these
cases do stand for the proposition that rejection of the diminished capacity the-
ory does not necessarily warrant rejection of the mens rea theory.
53. 827 F.2d at 901 n.12. The court further noted that the recent circuit
court cases focused on expert testimony and not the exclusion of all evidence
bearing on mental condition including the defendant's own testimony. Id. at
902 n. 12. Since the district court's instructions barred both types of testimony,
the government actually sought a broader ruling than these cases had given. Id.
at 896 n.2.
Additionally, these circuit court cases involved the application of state
rather than federal law. Id. at 902 n.12. In each of these cases, the state legisla-
ture or state court had decided that such expert testimony was irrelevant for the
purpose offered. Id. Thus, if the rationale of these cases were applied, exclusion
of evidence on mens rea in federal prosecutions would be permissible "only if
Congress had determined that psychiatric evidence on the issue of mens rea was
inherently irrelevant or unreliable," which it has not. Id.
10
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nology when discussing the diminished capacity/mens rea/insanity
question, 54 the court noted that it was possible to "identify the 'dimin-
ished responsibility' defenses that Congress had intended section 17(a)
to prohibit. 55 The court identified four variations of the diminished ca-
pacity defense. The first variation, which the Third Circuit adopted in
Pohlot, is really an evidentiary doctrine which allows evidence of mental
abnormality to be admitted on the mens rea issue. 56 The second varia-
tion allows the defendant "to show not only that he lacked the mens rea
in the particular case but also that he lacked the capacity to form the
[necessary] mens rea."'5 7 The third variation, the "pure form dimin-
ished responsibility defense," permits the jury to mitigate the sentence
that the defendant will receive if the jury believes that the defendant's
mental abnormality makes him less culpable than his normal counter-
part.5 8 The fourth variation is the "covert partially diminished capacity
defense," which is created when courts "admit evidence of mental ab-
normality that does not truly negate mens rea," thus making it possible
for a jury to excuse criminal conduct because of the defendant's mental
condition. 59
54. Id. at 903. "As the conflicting cases ... indicate, the terms 'diminished
responsibility' and 'diminished capacity' do not have a clearly accepted meaning
in the courts." Id. For a further discussion of the various formulations of the
diminished capacity defense, see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 903.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 903-04. Commentators have noted that "only in the most ex-
traordinary circumstances could a defendant actually lack the capacity to form
mens rea as it is normally understood in American law." Id. at 903 (citing
Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children
of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 834 (1977)). "Commentators have
therefore argued that permitting evidence and arguments about a defendant's
capacity to form mens rea distracts and confuses the jury from focusing on the
actual presence or absence of mens rea." Id. at 903-04 (citing Arenella, The Di-
minished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed
Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 863 (1977); Morse, Undiminished Confusion in
Diminished Capacity, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 44-45 (1984)).
58. Id. at 904. The court stated that "[a]lthough such a formal defense is
largely unknown in the United States, many legal doctrines may work similarly."
Id. The court referred to Professor Morse's contention that the Model Penal
Code creates a diminished capacity type defense by reducing murder to involun-
tary manslaughter where the killing occurred while the defendant was suffering
from an extreme emotional disturbance. Id. at 904 n. 14 (citing Morse, Undimin-
ished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 22-23
(1984)).
59. Id. at 904. The court called this a "covert" defense in contrast to the
"explicit doctrine of diminished responsibility" of the third variation. Id. For a
discussion of the third variation, see supra note 58 and accompanying text. The
court noted that such psychiatric evidence may mislead a jury about the legal
requirements of mens rea since mens rea is generally satisfied merely "by any
showing of purposeful activity, regardless of its psychological origins." Id. The
court presented the following case examples of this variation: United States v.
White, 766 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1985) (defendant claimed lack of mens rea to dis-
tribute cocaine because of psychological domination by her mother); Common-
11
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The court noted that allowing evidence of mental abnormality to
negate mens rea made it possible for a defendant to offer arguments and
testimony that might confuse ajury, and that some psychiatric testimony
on the mens rea issue "may easily slide into... theories of defense more
akin to justification."'60 For these reasons, Congress barred from juries'
consideration the latter three formulations of the "diminished responsi-
bility," doctrine: "Only the first of our typology of 'defenses' is permis-
sible, namely the use of evidence to prove that a defendant actually
lacked mens rea."'6 ' However, the court was also aware of the "strong
danger of misuse" in allowing psychiatric evidence to prove lack of mens
rea.62
The court believed that these dangers could be lessened by requir-
ing that psychiatric evidence be supported by a legally acceptable theory
of mens rea. 63 To ensure this, the Third Circuit directed trial courts
" 'to determine whether the proof offered is grounded in sufficient sci-
entific support to warrant use in the courtroom, and whether it would
aid the jury in deciding the ultimate issues.' "64 Additionally, the court
of appeals stated that the danger of misuse would be reduced if district
courts evaluated the admissibility of the psychiatric evidence outside the
presence of the jury.65 When the court applied this standard to the facts
of the Pohlot case, it held that the evidence was properly excluded be-
cause Pohlot failed to support his psychiatric evidence with a legally ac-
ceptable theory of mens rea. 66
The primary question raised by Pohlot is whether the Third Circuit,
wealth v. Tempest, 496 Pa. 436, 437 A.2d 952 (1981) (psychiatrist testified that
defendant lacked mens rea for first degree murder, despite lengthy planning and
actual commission of murder, because she suffered from chronic schizophrenia).
827 F.2d at 904.
The court observed that the California Supreme Court adopted a dimin-
ished responsibility defense. Id. at 904-05. The court examined the line of Cali-
fornia cases which developed that defense as an example of how "the strict use
of psychiatric evidence to negate mens rea may easily slide into wider usage that
opens up the jury to theories of defense more akin to justification." Id. at 905.
For a discussion of the California cases, see infra note 97.
60. 827 F.2d at 905.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 905-06. For a discussion of the court's formulation of a legally
acceptable theory of mens rea, see infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
64. Id. at 905 (quoting United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976)). The court directed trial courts to be
careful in deciding whether to admit evidence of mental abnormality. Id. The
court noted that the "[n]otions of intent, purpose and premeditation are mallea-
ble and at their margins imprecise. But the limits of these concepts are ques-
tions of law" for the district court to decide. Id.
65. Id. at 906.
66. Id. at 906-07. For a discussion of the court's application of its "legally
acceptable theory of mens rea" test to the Pohlot trial, see infra notes 10 1-05 and
accompanying text.
19881 665
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through its interpretation of the common law concept of mens rea, mis-
construed either the language or the intent of section 17, thereby creat-
ing a loophole through which criminal defendants can circumvent the
confines of the Act. A careful reading of the Pohlot opinion, focusing on
the scope of the court's holding, the rationale for its holding and the
application of this holding to the facts before it, reveals that the Third
Circuit's decision is consistent with both congressional intent and the
common law.
The Third Circuit's holding consists of two parts. The first compo-
nent holds that section 17, by its own terms and by interpretation of its
legislative history, does not preclude the admission of evidence relating
to mental abnormality on the mens rea issue. 6 7 The second component
holds that such evidence is admissible only if supported by a legally ac-
ceptable theory of mens rea.68 The threshold determination, therefore,
is whether the court correctly construed the scope of section 17.69 This
involves an examination of the court's interpretation of both the Act's
legislative history and the common law. The court's interpretation of
the legislative history depended upon how it interpreted certain com-
mon law principles'such as "mens rea" and "defense." 70 Accordingly,
this analysis will focus on the court's understanding of mens rea and
what constitutes a legally acceptable theory of mens rea. 7 1 Finally, it will
briefly consider whether Pohlot is consistent with Congress' intent when
67. Id. at 897. "Because admitting psychiatric evidence to negate mens
[rea] does not constitute a defense but only negates an element of the offense,
§ 17(a) by its terms does not bar it." Id. For a discussion of the court's interpre-
tations of the legislative history of the Act, see supra notes 34-42 and accompany-
ing text.
68. Id. at 906. "[T]he Insanity Defense Reform Act... require[s] the exclu-
sion of evidence that does not support a legally acceptable theory of a lack of
mens rea." Id. For a discussion of this concept, see infra notes 94-105 and ac-
companying text.
69. The court noted that "the wording of the statute and the legislative
history leave no doubt that Congress intended... to bar only alternative 'affirm-
ative defenses' . . . [and] not evidence that disproves an element of the crime
itself." Id. at 897; accord United States v. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (N.D.
Cal. 1985) (legislative history of act and overall statutory scheme indicate that
section 17 has no effect on admissibility of evidence offered to show lack of spe-
cific intent); see also United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1130-32 (D.D.C.
1987) (adopted approach of Frisbee).
70. The court maintained that the legislative history indicated that Con-
gress used the term "affirmative defense" in its precise legal sense. 827 F.2d at
899 n.7; see also United States v. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (N.D. Cal.
1985) (legislative history indicates that Congress intended term "affirmative de-
fense" be given its traditional meaning). Similarly, the Pohlot court assumed that
the terms "mens rea" and "insanity" were used in their legal sense. See 827 F.2d
at 897-900.
71. For a discussion of the court's understanding of mens rea, see infra
notes 73-93 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court's understand-
ing of a legally accepted theory of mens rea, see infra notes 94-105 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 33: p. 654666
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it enacted the Act.
72
The Third Circuit's differentiation among the overlapping and in-
terrelated doctrines of mens rea, insanity and diminished capacity is the
cornerstone of the Pohlot decision. 73 The court distinguished these con-
cepts by examining their relative functions for assessing criminal liability
as well as their conceptual differences.
7 4
Initially, the court noted that there was a functional difference be-
tween mens rea and any insanity defense. 75 Mens rea is an element of
72. For a discussion of consistency with congressional intent, see infra notes
108-09 and accompanying text.
73. The Supreme Court described the interrelationship of these doctrines
in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). In Powell the Supreme Court referred
to mens rea, insanity and justification as some of the "interlocking and overlapping
concepts which the common law has utilized to assess ... moral accountability
.... " Id. at 535-36. This "overlap" has caused courts considerable difficulty
over whether mens rea and insanity are synonymous. Compare Muench v. Israel,
715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding Wisconsin law limiting psychiatric evi-
dence to insanity stage of bifurcated trial), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984) and
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) (one who lacks capacity to
control his actions cannot possess guilty mind necessary for crime) and Fisher v.
United States, 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (jury was not to consider evidence of
defendant's mental deficiency in deciding if he acted with premeditation and
deliberation), aff'd, 328 U.S. 463 (1946) with Bowen v. Kemp, 832 F.2d 546 (11 th
Cir. 1987) (although insanity defense consists of evidence negating the existence
of criminal intent, two defenses are not the same), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1120
(1988) and United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d 419, 421 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Although
the accused's sanity is an ingredient of the requisite mens rea, 'the existence or
nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or
nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime.' ") (quoting Mulla-
ney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)) and United
States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1132 (2d Cir. 1975) (lack of specific intent is
superficially similar to insanity but is legally distinct argument) (citing United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998-1003 (D.C. Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 971 (1976).
74. 827 F.2d at 895-906. For a discussion of the different functions that
mens rea and the various insanity defenses serve, see infra notes 75-82 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the conceptual differences, see infra notes
83-93 and accompanying text.
75. 827 F.2d at 897. The court noted that the use of evidence of mental
disease to prove lack of the requisite mental state is "not a defense . . . but
merely a rule of evidence." Id.; see United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075
(7th Cir. 1977) (expert evidence of mental abnormality relevant in determining
defendant's subjective intent to harm victim even where no insanity defense
raised); United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 986 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1975) (use of
expert testimony to determine if defendant had capacity to form specific intent is
distinct from use of such evidence in connection with insanity defense or dimin-
ished capacity); United States v: Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998-1002 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (mental condition which is insufficient to exonerate may be relevant to
existence of specific mental state required for crime); Rhodes v. United States,
282 F.2d 59, 60-61 (4th Cir.) (where statute requires that specific mental state
accompany physical act, full exposition of pertinent evidence is permitted), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 912 (1960); see also, Arenella, supra note 4, at 833; Morse, supra
note 4, at 6; Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a
Crime, 56 YALE L.J. 959, 962-65 (1947).
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the crime charged, part of the crime's definition; insanity is a defense to
the crime charged. 76 Failure to prove mens rea means that the prosecu-
tion has failed to prove that the defendant committed the crime
charged. 77 A successful insanity claim, on the other hand, does not nec-
essarily controvert the fact that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged; rather, it establishes that he is not criminally responsible.78
Therefore, even if there were no conceptual differences between mens rea
and insanity, courts would still be constrained to treat them differently
because different constitutional requirements govern the burden of
proof of the elements of a crime and the defenses to that crime. 7 9
Essentially, the court was concerned that a blanket exclusion of evi-
dence that tends to disprove the government's case would effectively re-
lieve the government of its burden of proof and possibly preclude
evidence relevant to the defendant's innocence.8 0 The court considered
76. 827 F.2d at 897. In support of this proposition, the district court in
United States v. Frisbee stated that "evidence used to negate the existence of an
element of the crime would not traditionally be considered part of an affirmative
defense because the evidence is used to show innocence, as opposed to an ex-
cuse or justification for an otherwise criminal act." 623 F. Supp. 1217, 1220
(N.D. Cal. 1985). The Supreme Court recognized and applied this distinction in
the context of voluntary intoxication in Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631 (1881). In
Hopt the Court stated that voluntary intoxication, while not a defense to a mur-
der charge, was a material consideration in deciding whether the accused acted
with deliberate premeditation and was thus guilty of first degree murder. Id. at
633-34.
77. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 1.8(b), at 49. "[T]o secure a
conviction [the prosecution must] convince the trier of fact of the existence of
each element" of the crime. Id.
78. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 3, §§ 1.8, 4.1.
The insanity defense is quite different from other defenses in that the
result ... is not acquittal and outright release of the accused but rather
a special form of verdict or finding ('not guilty by reason of insanity')
which is usually followed by commitment of the defendant to a mental
institution. Thus, its purpose is usually said to be that of separating
from the criminal justice system those who would only be subjected to a
medical-custodial disposition.
Id. § 4.1, at 304.
79. See 827 F.2d at 900-03. For discussion of the different constitutional
requirements, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court has held that due process requires the government to prove every element
of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
363-64 (1970). However, due process is not violated if the defendant has the
burden of proving his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790 (1952).
80. 827 F.2d at 900-01. See Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59, 60 (4th
Cir.) (where statute requires "that a specific state of mind shall accompany the
act, . . .full exposition of the pertinent evidence [to prove lack of mens rea,
including psychiatric testimony] is permitted"), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912 (1960);
cf. United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 52-53 (10th Cir.) (exclusion of psychi-
atric proof which touches upon defendant's competency "causes concern" but
not reversible error, because of vagueness of proof offered), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
925 (1976).
The court further noted that "[t]he defendant's right to present a defense
668 [Vol. 33: p. 654
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this constitutional question sufficiently substantial8 ' to warrant the
adoption of a potentially confusing rule of evidence despite the "strong
danger of misuse" of such evidence. 82
However, it was the conceptual difference between mens rea, the fed-
eral insanity defense and the diminished capacity defense which pro-
vided the basis for the court's holding.8 3 Throughout the opinion, the
court implicitly acknowledged that each concept addressed a different
aspect of a defendant's mental capabilities.8 4 The court's understanding
of what constituted a legally acceptable theory of mens rea hinged on
the distinction the court made between mens rea and diminished
capacity.
The court defined mens rea in the most basic terms: it equated
mens rea with conscious awareness. 8 5 If an individual was aware of his
or her actions, the mens rea element would be satisfied.8 6 Mens rea
does not require that the defendant fully understand the consequences
of his or her action8 7 or that the defendant engage in self-reflection;8 8
... includes the right to the admission of competent, reliable, exculpatory evi-
dence." Id. at 900-01; see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-302
(1973) (ordered a new trial because trial court excluded adverse witness' out of
court confession); Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.) (exclusion of
psychiatric testimony on issue of specific intent created an arbitrary and uncon-
stitutional classification), cert. dismissed sub nom. Israel v. Hughes, 439 U.S. 801
(1978). For a further discussion of a defendant's right to present evidence, see
supra note 44 and the cases cited therein.
81. 827 F.2d at 903. "The constitutional issues are sufficiently substantial
• . .that we are unwilling to create a, rule of evidence that would raise them
[absent] explicit Congressional direction." Id.
82. Id. at 890, 905. To minimize these dangers, the "Congressional prohi-
bition of diminished responsibility defenses requires courts to carefully scruti-
nize psychiatric defense theories bearing on mens rea." Id. at 890. For a
discussion of the various measures the court mandated to minimize the dangers
of misusing psychiatric testimony, see infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
83. See 827 F.2d at 890.
84. Id. at 900. In United States v. Byrd, 834 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1987), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the relationship
between insanity and mens rea. In rejecting the defendant's claim that willful-
ness (an element of the charge of robbery) "cannot be proven independently of
sanity," the court said that "[w]illfulness is not coterminous with the legal con-
cept of insanity." Id. at 146-47; see also Dix v. Kemp, 804 F.2d 618, 622 (11th
Cir. 1986) ("Where a defendant offers evidence tending to show he was insane,
a jury might find that the defendant was sane and therefore criminally responsi-
ble for his acts, while at the same time finding that the state failed to prove that
the defendant had the requisite intent ...."), vacated and reh'g granted, 809 F.2d
1486 (11 th Cir.), afd sub nom., Bowen v. Kemp, 832 F.2d 546 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(en banc), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1988).
85. 827 F.2d at 906; see also Arenella, supra note 4, at 834 ("As long as the
mens rea element is defined in terms of the conscious mind's cognitive and af-
fective function, it is perfectly plausible that [a] defendant entertained the spe-
cific mental state but was still insane." (footnote omitted)).
86. 827 F.2d at 890, 906.
87. Id. at 907. The court provided an example:
We often act intending to accomplish the immediate goal of our activ-
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purposeful activity is enough. 89 In contrast, the federal insanity defense
focuses on the defendant's cognitive ability.90 Traditionally this in-
cluded a determination of whether the defendant understood right from
wrong or appreciated the nature and quality of his or her acts.91 Since
mens rea and insanity address different issues, it is rare that "a legally
insane defendant actually lack[s] the requisite mens rea purely because
of mental defect."'9 2 Consequently, the court reasoned that a district
court judge can determine whether the offered psychiatric evidence is
relevant to mens rea, insanity, both or neither.9 3
The court's discussion of the "prohibited diminished capacity de-
fenses" emerged in its consideration of what constituted an acceptable
mens rea theory. 94 The diminished capacity defenses, which Congress
intended to preclude in section 17, generally involve the "exoneration
or mitigation of an offense because of a defendant's supposed psychiat-
ric compulsion or inability or failure to engage in normal reflection." '9
5
ity, while not fully appreciating the consequences of our acts. But pur-
poseful activity is all the law requires. When one spouse intentionally
kills the other in the heat of a dispute, he or she will rarely appreciate
the consequences of the murder. The spouse is guilty of homicide
nonetheless.
Id.
88. Id. at 906. The court referred to Professor Morse's position on this
point:
'[Is the state of lacking self-awareness a state] in which mens rea is lack-
ing? On the one hand, the defendant knows at some level what he is
doing and intends to do it, on the other hand, he is not fully conscious
of the actions in the usual sense.' . . . Professor Morse's point is that a
lack of self-reflection does not mean a lack of intent and does not ne-
gate mens rea. We agree.
Id. (quoting Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 46-47 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
89. Id. at 904, 907.
90. Comment, supra note 4, at 351. The federal standard requires "total
impairment of the cognitive element ... and allocates to the jury the dispositive
issue of legal insanity which should only be found if the accused is unable to
distinguish between right and wrong." Id. Additionally, the federal standard is
essentially a codification of M'Naghten, which is described supra note 3.
M'Naghten is "defined in terms of lack of cognition." W. LAFAVE & A. Scovr,
supra note 3, § 4.1 (a), at 311.
91. W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, supra note 3, § 4.1(a), at 311. The M'Naghten
test requires that a defendant know neither the nature and quality of his act nor
that it was wrong (i.e., morally or legally). Id. The federal insanity test most
probably incorporates both aspects of M'Naghten. See Comment, supra note 4,
at 351.
92. 827 F.2d at 900; see also Arenella, supra note 4, at 834-35.
93. 827 F.2d at 903-07.
94. Id. at 903-06. For a discussion of this point, see supra notes 47-66 and
accompanying text. The court also discussed the diminished capacity defenses
when it discussed the scope of section 17 and Congress' intent when it passed
this section. Id. at 897-900. For a discussion of the court's evaluation of dimin-
ished capacity in this context, see supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at 890.
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The unusual feature of these defenses is that they incorporate aspects of
both mens rea and insanity.9 6 It is the Third Circuit's demarcation be-
tween mens rea and diminished capacity as well as the safeguards it im-
posed which makes Pohlot a significant decision. 97
By requiring defense counsel to articulate a legally acceptable the-
ory of mens rea and by requiring courts to scrutinize these theories, the
Third Circuit minimized the risk that diminished capacity defenses will
be resurrected in the guise of mens rea.98 A defendant may argue only
that he did not possess the requisite mental state when he committed
the acts constituting the crime.9 9 If the evidence offered delves into the
defendant's subconscious mind or seems to be an explanation for the
defendant's conduct, then the evidence is excludable because it does not
address the question of whether the defendant possessed the requisite
awareness when he acted; rather, this evidence supports a prohibited
96. As the court readily admitted, the terms diminished capacity and dimin-
ished responsibility do not have readily accepted meanings in American courts.
Id. at 903. For a general discussion of the definitional confusion, see Arenella,
supra note 4; Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes Other Than the
Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051'(1975); Morse, supra note 4.
The California Supreme Court developed the diminished capacity defense
because of its dissatisfaction with the "all or nothing" aspect of the M'Naghten
test. See Comment, Diminished Capacity and California's New Insanity Test, 10 PAc.
L.J. 751, 752, 768 (1979). In very general terms, diminished capacity looks at
the defendant's ability, in light of any mental abnormalities, to harbor the spe-
cific state of mind which is required for a particular crime. Id. at 752; see People
v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 757, 518 P.2d 342, 347, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910, 915
(1974). Thus, diminished capacity melds mens rea's mental state element with
insanity's mental defect element.
97. As previously noted, the Third Circuit was concerned that a strict mens
rea rule could evolve into some form of diminished capacity. 827 F.2d at 890,
905; see supra note 60 and accompanying text. The court observed such an
evolution in California. 827 F.2d at 904-05. In People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330,
202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949), overruled, People v. Wetmore, 22
Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978), the California Supreme
Court adopted a strict mens rea. approach. In People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d
716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959), the court abandoned the distinction between evi-
dence of intent and the capacity to form intent. Finally in People v. Wolff, 61
Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964), the court effectively
adopted the European diminished responsibility defense when it reduced the
defendant's conviction from first to second degree murder because he was un-
able to meaningfully reflect on the gravity of the offense. "In this way, the court
made mental illness that did not directly correlate to any particular element of
mens rea a ground for reducing the severity of an offense." 827 F.2d at 905.
The Pohlot court noted that, in response to this line of cases, the California legis-
lature "abolished the use of evidence to show that a defendant lacks the capacity
to form mens rea [but] permitted the use of evidence of mental disease to show
that the defendant actually lacked mens rea." Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 28
(as amended West 1970 & Supp. 1988)).
98. 827 F.2d at 905-06.
99. 827 F.2d at 905; see also United States v. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217,
1219, 1224 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (court accepted defendant's argument that he did
not possess the requisite specific intent during the relevant time period to have
committed first degree murder); Arenella, supra note 4, at 828.
1988]
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diminished capacity type defense. 10 0
Distinguishing between an acceptable and an unacceptable theory
of mens rea requires a district court to identify the requisite mens rea for
the crime charged and then evaluate the offered evidence in light of that
identification. 10 1 For example, the requisite mental state for the crime
of murder-for-hire is that the defendant have the intent that a murder be
committed.' 0 2 The acts presented and proved at Pohlot's trial sup-
ported the jury's finding that Pohlot intended to plan a murder.' 0 3 It is
irrelevant to the crime that Pohlot did not intend to follow through with
the plan and murder his wife.' 0 4 Accordingly, the evidence offered was
properly excluded because it tended only to explain Pohlot's subcon-
100. 827 F.2d at 906-07. The court applied this standard to the facts of the
case before it:
In the context of the facts, both Pohlot's own testimony and that of
Dr. Glass relate clearly not to Pohlot's intent in a legal sense but to
Pohlot's meaningful understanding of his actions and their conse-
quences .... To accept this theory as a defense to mens rea requires
manipulation of the concept of intent beyond what the 'intent' element
of 18 U.S.C. § 1952A requires .... Pohlot['s] theory ... amounts
covertly to a variation of the ... defense precluded by § 17(a).
Id. at 907. For the relevant text of 18 U.S.C. § 1952A (Supp. VI 1986), see supra
note 15.
101. 827 F.2d at 890. The court cautioned that psychiatrists "are capable
of supplying elastic descriptions of mental states that appear to but do not truly
negate the legal requirements of mens rea." Id. Consequently, the court placed
the duty to carefully scrutinize such testimony on the courts. Id.; see also, United
States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1987) ("The receipt of this
expert testimony to negative the mental condition of specific intent requires
careful administration by the judge.") (quoting United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972)); cf United States v. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217,
1224 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (trial court may not let jury consider evidence of intent
when the crime only requires general intent or to reduce defendant's conviction
to a lesser crime when all elements of offense charged are satisfied).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1952A (Supp. IV 1986). Section 1952A is a crime of spe-
cific intent which requires that a certain act be committed with the intent to have
a murder committed. United States v. Pohlot, Crim. No. 85-00354-01 slip op. at
9-15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 1986) (WESTLAW, OCT. database, Mar. 31, 1986). If
the requisite intent exists, "the offense is complete whether or not the murder is
carried out or even attempted." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 34, at 3485. For the
text of this statute, see supra note 15.
103. 827 F.2d at 890, 906-07. The court decided that the excluded evi-
dence "could not, even if believed, demonstrate that Pohlot lacked the specific
intent to contract for the killing of his wife .... By his own admission, Pohlot
engaged in considerable planning and activity, and he finalized an agreement to
have his wife murdered." Id. at 890. For a review of Pohlot's "planning activ-
ity," see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 892. "While Pohlot may not psychologically have understood
the full consequences of this activity-and in one sense may not have wanted his
wife to die-the purpose of his activity was the hiring of someone to kill his
wife." Id. at 890. "[P]urposeful activity is all the law requires." Id. at 907. For a
discussion of the requisite intent for the crime of murder for hire, see supra note
102.
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scious motivation in planning his wife's murder. 0 5
The Third Circuit's analysis of Pohlot's legal theory demonstrates
that even in a "difficult case" it is possible for a court to determine the
admissibility of psychiatric evidence by determining what mental state
the criminal statute requires and then evaluating the offered evidence in
light of the statutory requirement and this very broad concept of mens
rea. 10 6 The foregoing analysis suggests that the court's distinction be-
tween mens rea and diminished capacity is sound and workable. It is
further suggested that the Third Circuit correctly concluded that Con-
gress had intended to preserve the mens rea concept and thus exclude
mens rea from the scope of the Act.10 7
The final question, therefore, is whether Pohlot is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the Insanity Defense Reform Act. Those pur-
poses include excluding needlessly confusing psychiatric testimony and
abolishing the diminished capacity defenses. 10 8 It is submitted that
Pohlot's mandate that district court judges carefully scrutinize all psychi-
atric evidence reduces the possibility that courts will frustrate the pur-
poses of the Act.' 0 9
In Pohlot, the Third Circuit confronted the difficult task of distin-
guishing mens rea from both insanity and diminished capacity. In hold-
ing that evidence of mental abnormality is admissible to show that the
defendant did not in fact possess the requisite mens rea, the court main-
tained the integrity of the Act. This approach also protects the individ-
ual's right to present competent evidence in his defense and to be
convicted only after the government has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt every material element of the offense charged.
Andrea Gennetti
105. Id. at 907. The excluded testimony focused on what Pohlot "really"
knew as well as on his unconscious mind. Id. at 906-07. The main thrust of
Pohlot's defense was that he lacked a meaningful understanding of his actions
and their consequences. Id. at 906. The Third Circuit felt that Pohlot's theory
required the court to manipulate the concept of intent beyond what the criminal
statute required. Id. at 907. Consequently, Pohlot did not present a legally ac-
ceptable theory of mens rea, rather he relied on a diminished capacity defense;
thus the district court properly excluded the evidence. Id.
106. See generally id. at 906-07.
107. Id. at 897.
108. Id. at 896 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3411). The Act also
deleted the volitional prong (irresistible impulse test) of the Model Penal Code
test. See supra note 5. The Act shifts onto the defendant the burden of proving
insanity by clear and convincing evidence. See United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d
419 (8th Cir. 1986) (shifting burden of proof onto defendant does not violate
due process). For the text of the Act, see supra note 1.
109. 827 F.2d at 890. For a list of the court's recommendations of how
district courts should scrutinize evidence to reduce the charges of abuse see
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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